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Abstract
In public-policy discussions about corporate disclosure, more is typ-
ically judged better than less. In particular, better disclosure is
seen as a way to reduce the agency problems that plague ﬁrms. We
show that this view is incomplete. In particular, our theoretical
analysis shows that increased disclosure is a two-edged sword: More
information permits principals to make better decisions; but it can,
itself, generate additional agency problems and other costs for share-
holders, including increased executive compensation. Consequently,
there can exist a point beyond which additional disclosure decreases
ﬁrm value. We further show that larger ﬁrms will tend to adopt
stricter disclosure rules than smaller ﬁrms, ceteris paribus. Firms
with better disclosure will tend, all else equal, to employ more able
management. We show that governance reforms that have imposed
greater disclosure could, in part, explain recent increases in both
ceo compensation and ceo turnover rates.
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Business • 2100 Neil Avenue • Columbus, OH 43210–1144.A response to recent corporate governance scandals, such as Enron and World-
com, has been the imposition of tougher disclosure requirements. For example,
Sarbanes-Oxley (sox) requires more and better information: More, for instance,
by requiring reporting of oﬀ-balance sheet ﬁnancing and special purpose enti-
ties; better, by its increasing the penalties for misreporting. In the public’s (and
regulators’) view, improved disclosure is good.
This view is an old one, dating at least to Ripley (1927) and Berle and
Means (1932). Indeed, there are good reasons why disclosure can increase the
value of a ﬁrm. For instance, reducing the asymmetry of information between
those inside the ﬁrm and those outside can facilitate a ﬁrm’s ability to issue
securities and consequently lower its cost of capital.1 Fear of trading against
those with privileged information could reduce willingness to trade the ﬁrm’s
securities, thereby reducing liquidity and raising the ﬁrm’s cost of capital. Better
disclosure presumably also reduces the incidences of outright fraud and theft by
insiders.
But if disclosure is unambiguously value-increasing, why have calls for more
disclosure—whether reforms advocated long ago by Ripley or Berle and Means
or embodied in more recent legislation like sox—been resisted by corporations?
What is the downside to more disclosure?2 The direct accounting costs of dis-
closure could lie behind some of this resistance. Some commentators have also
noted the possibility that disclosure could be harmful insofar as it could advan-
tage product-market rivals by providing them valuable information.3 Although
these factors likely play some role in explaining corporate resistance to disclo-
sure, it seems unlikely that they are the complete story. In addition to direct
costs and costs from providing information to rivals, we argue here that there
are important ways in which disclosure aﬀects ﬁrms through the governance
channel.
This paper arguesthat disclosure, as well as other governancereforms, should
be viewed as a two-edged sword. From a contracting perspective, increased in-
formation about the ﬁrm improves the ability of shareholders and boards to
monitor their managers. However, the beneﬁts of improved monitoring do not
ﬂow wholly to shareholders: If management has any bargaining power, then it
will capture some of the increased beneﬁt via greater compensation. Even ab-
sent any bargaining power, because better monitoring tends to aﬀect managers
adversely, managerial compensation will rise as a compensating diﬀerential. In
addition, increased monitoring can give management incentives to engage in
value-reducing activities intended to make them appear more able. At some
level of disclosure, these costs could outweigh the beneﬁts at the margin, so
increasing disclosure beyond that level would reduce ﬁrm value.
We formalize this argument as follows. We start with a very general model
of monitoring, governance, and bargaining. We show that if owners and man-
agement have opposing preferences with respect to disclosure, then increasing
1Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) were the ﬁrst to formalize this idea. For empirical ev-
idence, see Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), who document that ﬁrms’ cost of capital decreases
when they voluntarily increase disclosure. The idea that asymmetric information can harm
trade dates back to at least Akerlof’s (1970) “lemons” model.
2Because, as we discuss later, information improves—in a way we make precise—with either
the quantity or quality of information, we can think of more or better disclosure as equivalent
notions for our purposes.
3See Leuz and Wysocki (2006) for a recent survey of the disclosure literature. Feltham et
al. (1992), Hayes and Lundholm (1996), and Wagenhofer (1990) provide discussions of the
impact of information disclosure on product-market competition.Hermalin and Weisbach Introduction 2
disclosure leads to greater equilibrium managerial compensation (although pos-
sibly lower managerial utility). We then present a series of monitoring models,
both learning-based and agency-based ones, in which we prove that owners and
managers will have opposing preferences regarding disclosure. Consequently,
managerial compensation rising with increased disclosure is a characteristic of
many models of governance.
An implication of this logic is that ceo compensation should increase follow-
ing an exogenously imposed increase in the quantity or quality of information
that needs to be disclosed about a ﬁrm and its managers. This increase would
occur regardless of whether the reason for the increase was government regula-
tion or intense public pressure created by, for instance, increased media attention
to governance in light of scandals or economic conditions. A potential counter-
vailing incentive is that greater regulation or public scrutiny could reduce ceo
bargaining power, which one might expect would lower his compensation. We
consider this possibility in a setting in which a ceo’s threat-point in bargaining
declines one for one with the decline in his utility due to greater disclosure. We
show that, nonetheless, that ceo compensation still rises (unless he initially had
no bargaining power). Of course, such exogenous changes are often not wholly
limited to disclosure. For instance, public outrage in light of scandal or ﬁnancial
crisis could lead to both greater disclosure and make it politically infeasible to
raise executive compensation immediately. Consequently, in situations such as
the recent ﬁnancial crisis in which much attention has been given to the actions
and compensation of top managers of investment banks, our predicted eﬀect of
greater mandated disclosure on those managers’ compensation is likely to op-
erate with some lag (or possibly be oﬀset completely depending on the nature
and duration of these other eﬀects).
Anticipating the uses that owners may make of what they learn, the ceo
can have incentives to distort the owners’ information. A particular example is
where the ceo engages in myopic behavior to boost his short-term numbers at
the expense of more valuable longer-term investments (e.g., in a model along
the lines of Stein, 1989).4 We show that this is a downside to improving the
disclosure regime; that is, better disclosure can perversely lead to greater agency
problems.
In Section II, we extend our analysis in three ways. First, we show how
our results are aﬀected by ﬁrm characteristics, particularly size. We show, in
particular, that larger ﬁrms will tend, ceteris paribus, to have better disclosure
regimes, but also greater executive compensation. We then extend our analysis
to encompass a general equilibrium analysis of the entire market for ceos. We
show, among other results, that there will be a positive correlation between a
ﬁrm’s disclosure regime and its ceo’s ability in equilibrium. We further show
4Consistent with this argument, several studies have documented that passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act has lead to a reduction in risk-taking by ﬁrms (see Bargeron et al., 2007
and Litvak, 2007). The existence of myopia in corporate investing seems evident from many
corporate practices; for example, in a survey of 401 ﬁnancial executives, Graham et al. (2005)
ﬁnd that over half state that they are willing to delay starting a new project even if it entails
a decrease in value in order to meet an earnings target.Hermalin and Weisbach Introduction 3
that our partial equilibrium analysis carries over to a more general equilibrium
model insofar as a reform that increases disclosure for some ﬁrms will result in
greater compensation for all ceos.
The third extension addresses the following. In our one-point-in-time model,
there is no reason to predict that either owners or management would favor a
government-imposed tightening of disclosure regimes. Who, then, is pushing
governments to tighten disclosure? We show that in a more sequential model,
in which there are lags in compensation increases (for, perhaps, the political
reasons discussed above), the owners will in fact wish to lobby the government
to tighten the disclosure regime. In the short run, this increases the owners’
payoﬀs. Because there is no free lunch, ex ante the owners would, however,
prefer to commit not to so lobby the government.
In Section III, we discuss some of the empirical implications of our analysis.
One speciﬁc prediction is that an exogenously imposed increase in disclosure
requirements should lead to an increase in executive compensation and turnover,
which is consistent with the upward trend in ceo salaries and ceo turnover rates
that have accompanied the increased attention given to corporate governance
in recent years (see Kaplan and Minton, 2008).
Section IV contains a summary and conclusion. Proofs not given in the text
can be found in the appendix.
Our paper is related to some other recent work concerning the ceo’s ability
to distort information and disclosure policy. Song and Thakor (2006) deal with
the incentives of a ceo to provide less precise signals about the projects he
proposes to the board. Here, in contrast, we assume it is the owners (principal)
who determine the signal’s precision. Hermalin and Katz (2000), Singh (2004),
Goldman and Slezak (2006), and Axelson and Baliga (in press) assume there is
no uncertainty about the ceo’s ability, their focus being the ceo’s incentives
to distort information. Hermalin and Katz consider a situation in which the
ceo chooses the information regime and investigate his incentives to choose
a less informative regime than would be desired by the owners. In Singh’s
model, the issue is the board’s ability to obtain accurate signals about the
ceo’s actions. The primary concern of Goldman and Slezak is how the use of
stock-based compensation can induce the ceo to divert eﬀort to manipulating
the stock. In contrast, in our model the ceo can have incentives to manipulate
information about his ability. In addition, unlike us, Goldman and Slezak treat
disclosure rules as exogenous, whereas one of our objectives is to understand how
owners choose the value-maximizing rules. Axelson and Baliga, like Goldman
and Slezak, are interested in how compensation schemes can induce information
manipulation by the ceo. In particular, they present a model in which long-
term contracts are optimal because short-term measures can be manipulated.
But it turns out to be optimal to allow some manipulation of information or
lack of transparency because, otherwise, the long-term contracting equilibrium
would break down due to ex post renegotiation.
Although our focus is on disclosure, we note that many of our results would
carry over to consideration of other governance reforms. In particular, if owners
and ceos have opposing preferences with respect to the direct eﬀect of theseHermalin and Weisbach Model 4
reforms (i.e., Condition 1 below or its appropriate analogue holds), then the
insights of Sections I.B and II would continue to apply.
I The Model
A Timing of the Model
The model has the following timing and features.
Stage . The owners of a ﬁrm determine the disclosure regime. Such a regime
determines the amount of information made available in Stage 3 as well
as its quality.5
Stage . The owners hire a ceo.
Stage . Information is subsequently revealed to the owners.
Stage . Based on the information revealed in the previous stage, the owners update
their beliefs about payoﬀ-relevant parameters. They then take an action.
Stage . The ceo gets his payoﬀ, which depends—in part—on the action taken by
the owners.
Although bare bones, this model encompasses many situations, including:
1. The owners learn information about the ceo’s ability. The consequent
action is whether they keep or ﬁre the ceo. The ceo suﬀers a loss if ﬁred.
2. The owners learn information about the ﬁrm’s prospects. The consequent
action is whether to put resources into the ﬁrm or take them out. The
5Because information could be discarded, more information (data) must yield weakly bet-
ter information (estimates). Conversely, more precise information (estimates) can often be
interpreted as having more information (data). In this sense, then, there is essentially an
isomorphism between the amount and the quality of information. Hence, we will tend not
distinguish between quality and quantity of information in what follows (i.e., wherever we
write “more informative,” one can read “better informative” and vice versa). For instance,
as is well known (see, e.g., DeGroot, 1970, p. 167) if N random variables xn are identically
and independently distributed normally with unknown mean µ and variance σ2, where µ is a
normally distributed random variable with mean M and variance η2, then a suﬃcient statistic
for µ is
Mσ2 + η2  N
n=1 xn
σ2 + Nη2
and its precision is
σ2 + Nη2
σ2η2
So the precision is a function of N, the amount of information revealed. Alternatively, suppose
one statistic, x, is more informative than a second, y, in that there exists a third random
variable ε, independent of the parameter to be estimated, such that y = x + ε. Observe that
if one saw both y and ε, one could construct x; in this sense, x can be seen as having more
data (observing both y and ε) and y as less (observing y only).Hermalin and Weisbach Model 5
ceo’s utility increases with the amount of resources under his control (he
prefers to manage a larger empire to a smaller one; he can skim more the
more resources under his control; etc.).
3. The owners obtain information that oﬀsets the informational advantage of
the ceo. The consequent action is adjustment of the ceo’s compensation
plan. The ceo suﬀers a loss of information rents.
4. The owners’ information is reﬂected in the precision of the performance
measures used to provide the ceo incentives. The consequent action is
adjustment of the ceo’s compensation plan. The ceo suﬀers a loss of
quasi-rents.
B Bargaining
Let π(D)−w and U(D)+v(w) be, respectively, the expected payoﬀs to the own-
ers and ceo as a function of disclosure regime, D, and compensation, w. The as-
sumption that the ceo’s utility is additively separable in wage and disclosure—
to be precise, wage and owners’ action—is a property satisﬁed by the models
considered below. More money is preferred to less; hence, v( ) is strictly in-
creasing. There is, thus, little further loss of generality in our assuming that it
is diﬀerentiable everywhere. We assume that the ceo cannot be made to pay
for his job; so, w ≥ 0.6
We indicate that disclosure regime D is more informative than D′ by writing
D ≻ D′. By “more informative,” we mean in terms of some recognized notion
of informativeness, such as Blackwell informativeness. A condition that we
will prove holds true of the models considered in subsections I.C and D is the
following:
Condition 1 If D and D′ are two disclosure regimes such that D ≻ D′, then
π(D) ≥ π(D′) and U(D) < U(D′).
In words: Given a more informative disclosure regime and a less informative
regime, then the owners prefer the more informative regime and the ceo strictly
prefers the less informative regime ceteris paribus.
Now consider the setting of the ceo’s compensation, w, at stage 2. We
assume that w is set through some bargaining procedure that can be captured





+ (1 − λ)log
￿
U(D) + v(w) − ¯ u
￿
, (1)
where λ ∈ [0,1] is the owners’ bargaining power and 1−λ the ceo’s. The quan-
tity ¯ u is the ceo’s reservation utility (outside opportunity). For the moment,
6Throughout the paper, we rule out the ceo’s being compelled to make payments to the
ﬁrm. This assumption can be justiﬁed by appeals to limited liability or liquidity on the part of
the ceo, the nature of labor law, and the law’s general reluctance to enforce penalty clauses.
7Other bargaining games would yield similar results.Hermalin and Weisbach Model 6
consider it to be exogenous to the model (e.g., if the ceo retired, he would enjoy
utility ¯ u). The owners’ outside option is normalized to zero. Unless bargaining
is extreme (λ = 1 or = 0), both parties’ expected payoﬀs exceed their outside
options.
A key result of this section is
Proposition 1 Assume wage bargaining is generalized Nash and Condition 1
holds. Then the ceo’s compensation, as determined by the bargaining process,
is non-decreasing in how informative is the disclosure regime. Moreover, if the
ceo’s compensation is positive under a given disclosure regime and either he
does not have all the bargaining power (i.e., λ > 0) or the owners’ expected
payoﬀ is strictly increasing in the informativeness of the disclosure regime, then
his compensation will be strictly greater under a more informative regime.
To keep the analysis as straightforward as possible, we henceforth assume con-
ditions are such that the ceo’s compensation is, as in reality, always positive
in equilibrium.8 The reader can readily see how the statements of the following
propositions and their proofs should be modiﬁed for the case in which the ceo
receives zero compensation.
To gain intuition for Proposition 1, consider the two bargaining extremes. If
the owners have all the bargaining power, they will hold the ceo to his reser-
vation utility. Hence, any reduction in U(D) must be oﬀset with an increase
in w to keep the ceo at his reservation utility. Conversely, if the ceo has all
the bargaining power, then he captures all the owners’ expected proﬁt through
his compensation. If the owners’ expected proﬁt goes up, as would follow if
information is improved, then there is more for the ceo to capture and, hence,
the greater is his compensation. In between these extremes, the result follows
because both forces are at work: An increase in quality of information gener-
ates more expected proﬁt, which will be divided between owners and the ceo
through the bargaining process, and directly harms the ceo, which warrants
some oﬀsetting compensation for the ceo. The two forces act in tandem to
boost the compensation that the ceo receives.
Therefore, when the owners choose the disclosure regime (i.e., D), they will
take into account its impact on the ceo’s compensation. A naïve analysis that
considered only the direct eﬀect on the owners’ proﬁts from a change in disclo-
sure regime would overstate the beneﬁt to the owners from improving disclosure.
In particular, if the owners have chosen a net expected proﬁt-maximizing disclo-
sure regime, then a disclosure reform that raised π(D) would necessarily make
the owners worse oﬀ because the resulting increase in the ceo’s compensation
would exceed the increase in π(D).9
8If v′(w) → ∞ as w → 0, then the ceo’s compensation would always be positive in
equilibrium.
9Suppose D is the set of possible disclosure regimes. Proposition 1 does not determine
which element of D the owners will choose in equilibrium. Rather it oﬀers an explanation for
why it could be that their choice is not argmaxD∈D π(D). On the other hand, Proposition 1
does not rule out their choosing argmaxD∈D π(D).Hermalin and Weisbach Model 7
What would be the eﬀect of such a reform on the ceo? From Proposition 1,
it would, as noted, increase his compensation. What about his expected utility?
The following proposition provides conditions under which the ceo’s expected
utility is sure to fall.
Proposition 2 Assume wage bargaining is generalized Nash and Condition 1
holds. Assume, too, that neither party has all the bargaining power (i.e., assume
λ ∈ (0,1)). Finally, assume the ceo is either risk neutral or risk averse in in-
come. If there is a reform to disclosure that results in a disclosure regime that is
more informative than the one the owners would have chosen, then the ceo’s ex-
pected total utility is reduced. (That is, if D∗ would be the owners’ unconstrained
choice, Dr the reform level, Dr ≻ D∗, and w(D) denotes equilibrium compen-









What if we have extreme bargaining in which one side has all the bargaining
power? If the owners do, then the ceo is always held to ¯ u and he is, thus,
indiﬀerent to changes in the disclosure regime. If the ceo has all the bargaining
power, then the owners are indiﬀerent to disclosure regime and are, thus, willing
to choose any regime (i.e., D∗ is not well deﬁned). Given this indiﬀerence, there
is no reason for them not to choose the regime most preferred by the ceo, in
which case a binding reform would again lower the ceo’s utility.
Proposition 2 explains why ceos are likely to resist increases in disclosure
rules even though their compensation will increase as a consequence. Unless
they have no bargaining power—in which case they would have no reason to
be resistant—they are made worse oﬀ by an increase in disclosure that pushes
disclosure beyond the level the owners would desire.
It has been suggested to us that an exogenous increase in disclosure, either
through new regulations or increased attention by the media to a particular
industry, is likely to aﬀect many ﬁrms simultaneously. Such a change is likely
to lower ceos’ outside option, ¯ u, if their outside option is to work for another
ﬁrm. While it is not necessarily true that a reform would aﬀect all ﬁrms equally
nor that the outside option for every ceo is to work for another ﬁrm (some
might, for instance, be on the margin between work and retirement), we nev-
ertheless consider that possibility now as a shorthand way of dealing with such
general equilibrium eﬀects (we pursue an alternative approach in Section II.B).
Speciﬁcally, let ¯ u(D) be the outside option when the disclosure regime is D. In
keeping with the idea that all ﬁrms are being similarly aﬀected, suppose that
U(D) − ¯ u(D) ≡ ∆, where ∆ is a constant. In other words, the inherent utility
of the job, U(D), decreases one-for-one with the outside option as disclosure be-
comes more informative. In such a world, the consequence of stricter disclosure
will again be an increase in ceo compensation:
Proposition 3 Assume the owners’ gross expected proﬁt, π( ), is strictly in-
creasing in the informativeness of the disclosure regime (i.e., D ≻ D′ ⇒ π(D) >
π(D′)) and that bargaining is generalized Nash. Suppose that the ceo’s gross
expected utility from the job, U( ), decreases one-for-one with his outside option
as disclosure is made universally more informative (i.e., U(D)−¯ u(D) ≡ ∆, ∆ aHermalin and Weisbach Model 8
constant). Then an increase in the level of disclosure causes an increase in the
ceo’s compensation unless the owners have all the bargaining power, in which
case his compensation is unaﬀected.
Intuitively, in Proposition 1, there were two forces leading to an increase in
compensation in response to greater disclosure: the compensation diﬀerential
necessary to keep the ceo from slipping below his reservation utility level and
the fact than an increase in proﬁt is partially captured by the ceo through
the bargaining process. In Proposition 3, we assume away the compensating-
diﬀerential eﬀect, but the ability of the ceo to capture a share of the increased
proﬁts via bargaining means his income still rises with greater disclosure.
Proposition 3 can also be read as stating that if one observes a decline in
ceo compensation following a governance reform, then the reform is likely to
have reduced gross proﬁts (i.e., π(D)).
This analysis suggests that changes to disclosure requirements, while directly
beneﬁcial to owners also carry indirect costs. As such, the optimal level of disclo-
sure could be less than maximal disclosure even if disclosure were otherwise free
(i.e., if one were free to ignore the actual costs arising from stricter accounting
rules, more record keeping, etc.). Going beyond that level would then reduce
ﬁrm value. However, as the analysis also indicates, executive compensation
is not solely a function of managers’ distaste for greater scrutiny; in particu-
lar, the managers’ bargaining power and the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability also matter.
Consequently, reforms that aﬀect all three factors, such as those proposed in
response to the Financial Crisis of 2008, aﬀect executive compensation through
multiple channels. To the extent that such reforms independently reduce ﬁrm
proﬁts or reduce managerial bargaining power, our predicted result of greater
compensation could be mitigated or reversed.
C Learning Models of Governance
Condition 1 is crucial to the analysis so far. This then begs the questions of
whether Condition 1 is, indeed, a characteristic of governance. This and the
next subsection present a series of alternative models of governance and prove
they satisfy Condition 1 under mild conditions.
Suppose the the owners’ payoﬀ has the form rγ(a) − c(a), where a ∈ A
is the owners’ Stage-4 action, r is a random variable, and γ : A → R+ and
c : A → R+.10 The timing is that the owners choose their action before the
realization of r. We assume that r has some mean θ, which is an unknown
parameter. For instance, θ could be the ceo’s ability or some attribute of the
ﬁrm. Based on the information they learn at Stage 3, the owners update their
prior estimate of θ. Let ˆ θ denote the owners’ posterior estimate of r conditional
on the information learned at Stage 3. Observe, at the earlier Stage 1, ˆ θ is a
random variable with a mean equal to the mean of the unknown parameter (i.e.,
E{ˆ θ} = E{θ}).
10There is no gain in generality to assuming the owners’ payoﬀ is ρ(r)γ(a)−c(a), ρ(·) strictly
monotone, because the random variable could be redeﬁned as ˜ r = ρ(r).Hermalin and Weisbach Model 9
As one example ﬁtting these assumptions, let A = {0,1}, keep or ﬁre the
ceo, respectively. The random variable r is the payoﬀ if the incumbent ceo,
of ability θ, is retained (so γ(a) = 1 − a). If they ﬁre the ceo, they incur a
ﬁring cost (i.e., c(0) = 0 and c(1) > 0). The ﬁring cost can be seen as the cost
of dismissal, including the cost of disruption, less the expected payoﬀ from a
replacement ceo.
As a second example, let A = R and suppose a is capital (resources, more
generally) invested in the ﬁrm (so γ(a) = a). Assume quadratic adjustment
costs, so c(a) = a2/2.11
Other examples ﬁtting this general framework exist. Moreover, the two
examples given are isomorphic to other situations, such as deciding whether to
agree to a takeover bid (the ﬁrst example) or deciding on acquisitions or spinoﬀs
(the second example).
Of importance to the owners is the question of how good an estimator ˆ θ
is of the parameter θ; that is, how informative is the information used by the
owners to form ˆ θ. To understand the way in which informativeness aﬀects
the owners, we must model their decision making. Given their payoﬀ function
and information, the owners will choose a to maximize their expected proﬁt,
ˆ θγ(a) − c(a). Let a∗(ˆ θ) denote the solution. Deﬁne









In words, Π(ˆ θ) is the owners’ expected payoﬀ (ignoring payments to the ceo)
if their estimate is ˆ θ.
Lemma 1 The owners’ payoﬀ function Π( ) is convex.
Lemma 1 implies the owners are risk loving with respect to the estimator ˆ θ.
Given that the mean of ˆ θ is always the same (i.e., the mean of the underlying
parameter), it follows that the owners would prefer, ceteris paribus, a disclosure
regime in which the distribution of ˆ θ was riskier to one in which it was less
risky in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance. As shown in Baker
(2006), an estimator based on better information (in the Blackwell sense) is a
riskier estimator (in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance).12 To aid
intuition, suppose no information were received (obviously the least information
possible). Then ˆ θ would be invariant as it would equal whatever the prior
estimate was. Hence, adding information, which results in an estimate that
varies, must increase risk. A consequence of Lemma 1 and Baker is
Proposition 4 If D is a more informative disclosure regime than D′, then the
owners prefer D to D′, ceteris paribus.
11To be precise, the owners’ payoﬀ in this example is rK + ra − c(a), where K is existing
capital in the ﬁrm. The rK component is, however, irrelevant to the analysis at hand, so we
may ignore it going forward.
12Speciﬁcally, Baker’s Lemma 2 states that if signal s is more informative than signal s′
about a parameter θ, then estimates of θ based on s are riskier than estimates based on s′.Hermalin and Weisbach Model 10
What about the ceo’s preferences concerning the properties of ˆ θ and, thus,
disclosure regimes? We will show, via examples, that situations exist in which
the ceo prefers that ˆ θ be based on less information, rather than more.
To that end, consider the example in which the owners are deciding whether
to keep or ﬁre the ceo. It is readily seen that a∗(ˆ θ) = 1 if and only if ˆ θ < −c(1).
Assume the ceo suﬀers a utility loss of ℓ > 0 if ﬁred. The ceo’s utility, as a
function of ˆ θ, is thus
u(ˆ θ) =
￿
−ℓ, if ˆ θ < −c(1)
0, if ˆ θ ≥ −c(1)
(2)
(plus, possibly, an additive constant that we are free to ignore). The ceo’s ex






, where F( |D) is the distribution of
the estimate ˆ θ conditional on disclosure regime D. If D ≻ D′, then F(−x|D) >
F(−x|D′) for a positive measure of x ∈ R+ because F(−x|D) ≤ F(−x|D′)
generically is inconsistent with F( |D′) dominating F( |D) in the sense of second-
order stochastic dominance (
≥
ssd), a property that, as just noted, follows if D ≻
D′.13 This and Proposition 4 establish:
Proposition 5 Consider the ceo-dismissal model. Suppose the owners have
a discrete set of disclosure regimes from which to choose. Then there exists
a positive measure of ﬁring costs, c(1), such that the ceo always prefers one
disclosure regime more than a second if the ﬁrst is less informative than the
second. In other words, Condition 1 holds.
A similar result holds if we assume that, for any two disclosure regimes
D and D′, either F( |D) dominates F( |D′) in the dispersive order (denoted
F( |D)
≥
dispF( |D′)) or vice versa. Recall F( |D′)
≥
dispF( |D) if
F−1(ξ|D′) − F−1(ξ′|D′) < F−1(ξ|D) − F−1(ξ′|D)





≡ ξ. Because all distribu-
tions of ˆ θ have the same mean (namely, E{θ}), we can employ Theorem 2.B.10





ssdF( |D); hence, by Lemma 1, F( |D′)
≥
dispF( |D) implies the owners pre-
fer D to D′. The ceo has the opposite preferences:
Proposition 6 Consider the ceo-dismissal model. Suppose the median of the
estimate ˆ θ equals the mean and the mean exceeds −c(1). Then F( |D′)
≥
dispF( |D)
implies the owners prefer D to D′ and the ceo prefers D′ to D. In other words,
Condition 1 holds.
The requirement that the mean and median of the estimate ˆ θ coincide is met
by many estimation procedures. The condition that the mean of ˆ θ (i.e., E{θ})
exceed the ﬁring cost may be justiﬁed by noting that were that not the case,
13Recall that F(·|D′)
≥






dz ≤ 0 for all x and
< 0 for a positive measure of x. This couldn’t hold if F(−x|D) ≤ F(−x|D′) for almost every
x ∈ R+.Hermalin and Weisbach Model 11
then the owners would always wish to ﬁre the ceo in the absence of any new
information, which then begs the question of why they would have hired the
ceo in the ﬁrst place.
The intuition behind Proposition 6 is straightforward: F( |D′)
≥
dispF( |D)
means F( |D) has a fatter left tail than F( |D′). Because it is left-tail outcomes
that get him ﬁred, the ceo naturally prefers thinner left tails to fatter left tails,
ceteris paribus.
To see that regimes can be ordered by the dispersive order in a conventional
model of learning, consider the normal-learning model (see, e.g., DeGroot, 1970,
§9.5), which has often been employed in the study of corporate governance.14
Speciﬁcally, suppose that ceo ability, θ, is distributed normally with mean 0
and precision τ (i.e., variance 1/τ).15 At stage 3, the owners observe a signal
s, which is distributed normally with a mean equal to the ceo’s ability and a
precision δ. Hence, δ > δ′ means the signal given δ is more informative than the
signal given δ′; that is, δ > δ′ corresponds to D ≻ D′ (with the obvious pairing
of precisions and regimes). A result for the normal-learning model is
Corollary 1 Consider the ceo-dismissal model. Suppose the estimate ˆ θ is
formed according to the normal-learning model.16 Then the mean and median
of ˆ θ coincide. If D is a more informative disclosure regime than D′ (the signal
has higher precision under the former than the latter), then F( |D′)
≥
dispF( |D).
Hence, the owners prefer D to D′ and the ceo prefers D′ to D. In other words,
Condition 1 follows.
If the ceo’s payoﬀ is such that he is risk averse in ˆ θ, then Condition 1
would necessarily follow and the analysis of the previous subsection validated.
To illustrate such a model, consider the investment model sketched above.17
Executives are often painted as empire builders. They, for instance, derive
status or otherwise improved reputations from running a larger enterprise. In
addition, a larger ﬁrm presents greater opportunities to consume perquisites.
One could even envision an entrenchment story: As resources are put into the
ﬁrm, the ceo utilizes them in ways that help entrench him or permit him to
pursue pet projects. If resources are taken out of the ﬁrm, the ceo must give up
14A partial list such models is Holmstrom(1999 [1982]) on agency problems due to career
concerns; Stein (1989) on managerial myopia; Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) on board be-
havior and structure; and Hermalin (2005) as a means to tie together trends in governance.
15The analysis merely requires that the expected value of θ exceed −c(1). A mean of zero
is convenient and without further loss of generality.




(see, e.g., DeGroot, 1970, p. 167, for a proof).
17Another model that would have this property is one in which ˆ θ is a posterior estimate
of the ceo’s ability and the ceo’s future wage is a function of his estimated ability. If the
composite function of his utility for income and income as a function of estimated ability is
concave in estimated ability (this would be true, for instance, if the ceo captures a constant
share of his estimated ability and he is risk averse in income), then the ceo is risk averse in ˆ θ.Hermalin and Weisbach Model 12
pet projects or become less entrenched. Consequently, suppose that the ceo’s
utility is u(K + a), where K is the current size of the ﬁrm and a are resources
the owners add to the ﬁrm (subtract if a < 0). We can further speculate that
u(K + a) could be concave (at least locally) in a: A standard assumption is
that preferences exhibit diminishing margins. Alternatively, one could adopt a
loss-aversion model with a reference point at K; that is, the ceo loses more by
having the ﬁrm reduced by some amount than he gains by having it expanded
by the same amount.
Recall the owners have a quadratic adjustment cost, c(a) = a2/2. It is readily
seen that their best response to the estimate ˆ θ is a∗(ˆ θ) = ˆ θ. Hence, the ceo’s
utility, as a function of ˆ θ, is u(K + ˆ θ). Because his payoﬀ is concave in a, the
ceo exhibits risk aversion in ˆ θ. It follows from Baker (2006) and Proposition 4:
Proposition 7 Consider the investment model. Suppose the ceo’s utility is
increasing and concave in capital. Then if D is a more informative disclosure
regime than D′, then the owners prefer D to D′ and the ceo prefers D′ to D.
In other words, Condition 1 holds.
This last model lends itself to simple examples that can, when given plausible
numbers, oﬀer some sense of the economic signiﬁcance of this analysis. To that
end, suppose the ceo’s utility is w+u(K+a), where u(K+a) = −exp(−a−K),
and that ¯ u = 0. Suppose the owners form the estimate ˆ θ according to the
normal-learning model given above. Given ˆ θ, the owners’ expected proﬁt is ˆ θ2/2.
Hence, prior to learning ˆ θ, their expected proﬁt is Var(ˆ θ)/2. Given ˆ θ, the ceo’s





. It is readily shown that Nash bargaining
yields













/∂K < 0, the sensitivity of ceo compensation to greater
disclosure is less at large ﬁrms than at small ﬁrms.





which is an increasing function of δ, the precision of the signal. Hence, we can
view the owners’ problem as one of choosing Var(ˆ θ) to maximize Var(ˆ θ)/2 − w









18Observe Var(s) = Var(s−θ)+Var(θ) = 1/δ+1/τ. Expression (3) follows from footnote 16
supra. See the proof of Corollary 1 for further details.Hermalin and Weisbach Model 13
Provided K ≤ 1
2τ, this program has a unique interior maximum:19 Var(ˆ θ) = 2K.
Observe this implies that larger ﬁrms will have a higher level of disclosure in
equilibrium. Calculations reveal that equilibrium compensation is
w = (1 − λ)K + λ,
so ceos of larger ﬁrms enjoy greater compensation.
To get a sense of magnitudes suppose—working in millions of dollars—that
the standard deviation of underlying productivity parameter θ was
√
10 (i.e.,
τ = 1/10); the ﬁrm’s current working capital, K, is $4 million; and the owners
have the lion’s share of the bargaining power, λ = .95. From above, the owners
maximize their expected proﬁt by setting Var(ˆ θ) = 8; that is, δ = 2/5. Further
calculations reveal that the owners’ expected proﬁt is $2.85 million. The ceo’s
compensation is $1.15 million. At this equilibrium, calculations show that the
elasticity of compensation with respect to disclosure is approximately .696 (i.e.,
a 1% greater level of disclosure increases the ceo’s compensation by 0.696%). As
a comparison, suppose that disclosure were set at its maximum (i.e., δ = ∞),
then the owners’ expected proﬁt is approximately $2.16 million. The ceo’s
compensation would be $2.83 million.
A possible objection to Proposition 7 is that it relies on the diﬃcult-to-
verify assumption that the ceo is risk averse with respect to capital levels. As
an alternative model, suppose the ceo’s utility for size is simply K + a; that
is, risk neutral. Suppose now that the ceo can take an action x ∈ [1,∞) that
causes the owners to misperceive the estimate ˆ θ as xˆ θ whenever ˆ θ ≥ 0. If ˆ θ < 0,
their perception is correct. There are numerous actions that ceo’s can take
to boost earnings or other measures of performance in the short run and such
signal jamming is often seen as a potential agency problem (see, e.g., Stein,
1989 for a discussion). The owners, understanding the structure of the game,
will divide xˆ θ, when positive, by xe, the value of x they anticipate the ceo has
chosen in equilibrium. Hence, their choice of a will be xˆ θ/xe. The condition for







ˆ θdF(ˆ θ|D) − g(x),
where g : [1,∞) → R+ is the ceo’s cost of eﬀort function, which we assume is
convex and satisﬁes g(1) = g′(1) = 0 and limx→∞ g′(x) = ∞ (these assumptions
ensure the existence of unique interior maxima in what follows). Employing




1 − F(ˆ θ|D)
￿
dˆ θ = xeg′(xe).
An increase in the left-hand side implies an increase in xe. If D ≻ D′ in the
Blackwell sense, then F( |D′)
≥










1 − F(ˆ θ|D′)
￿
dˆ θ.
19For K > 1
2τ , the solution is the corner Var(ˆ θ) = 1/τ (corresponding to δ = ∞).Hermalin and Weisbach Model 14
It follows that the value of xe increases as disclosure becomes more informative.
Given the ceo’s equilibrium utility is −g(xe), it follows that the ceo prefers a
less informative regime to a more informative regime ceteris paribus. We have
shown:
Proposition 8 Consider the investment model. Suppose the ceo can engage
in costly-to-him signal jamming that inﬂates the estimate of the underlying pa-
rameter when that estimate is non-negative. Then if D is a more informative
disclosure regime than D′, then the owners prefer D to D′ and the ceo prefers
D′ to D. In other words, Condition 1 holds.
It is worth remarking that this analysis identiﬁes another cost to improved
disclosure: If, as in many models (e.g., Stein, 1989), the ceo’s action is directly
costly to the owners (e.g., apparent proﬁtability today is boosted at the expense
of true proﬁts tomorrow), then a more informative disclosure regime means
more of this undesired action in equilibrium.20 Our model thus reinforces a
more general point in the economics of monitoring: The greater the monitoring
(e.g., the better is disclosure), the greater is the agent’s marginal beneﬁt from
concealing or distorting information and, thus, the greater the eﬀort he will
expend on these undesired activities. These eﬀorts represent an additional cost
to improving monitoring.21
One possibility we have not considered is the use of a richer set of contracts
for owners and the ceo to use to mitigate some of the tension between them.
In particular, in these learning models, the consequence of better disclosure
is exposing the ceo to greater risk. One might, therefore, think of providing
him insurance. Given the owners have been assumed to be risk neutral in
money, eﬃciency dictates they bear all the risk—fully insure the ceo—ceteris
paribus. Were the owners to do so, the consequence would be to eliminate
any motive to have the signal be less than maximally informative. In a simple
model, for instance when the owners are deciding between keeping or dismissing
the incumbent ceo and u( ) is given by (2), then a golden parachute equal to
the ceo’s loss should he be dismissed is optimal and—in the normal-learning
model—the owners should choose to make the signal maximally informative (see
Proposition A.1 in the appendix).
On other hand, it seems unreasonable to predict that the owners would
want to fully insure the ceo. After all, if they fully insure him, then they are
in a position of paying him more the worse he performs (i.e., low values of the
signal are more rewarded than high values). This would create rather perverse
incentives for the ceo; in particular, if there is any moral hazard at all, then
20Stein (1989, p. 663) makes a similar observation about increased informativeness and
greater eﬀorts at signal jamming. The structures of our two models are, though, somewhat
diﬀerent and changes in informativeness in his model are assumed to be exogenous and not
tied to the choice of disclosure regime.
21It is worth noting that even if such eﬀort is not directly costly to the principal, she may
still pay for it because the agent could require greater pay to compensate him for the disutility
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full insurance would backﬁre on the owners. In addition, one can conceive
of situations in which the owners’ information is not veriﬁable. For instance,
suppose it reﬂects sensitive or proprietary information, is diﬃcult to quantify,
or is diﬃcult to describe ex ante. In such cases, it would be infeasible to base
an insurance contract on it. Another reason the information could be private
is that the agent in question is at a level at which public information is not
released or is otherwise not available; he could be, for example, a plant manager
and it is top management that is playing the owners’ role.
D Agency Models of Governance
We now illustrate that “classic” agency models can cause owners and ceo to
hold diﬀerent preferences over disclosure regimes.
In what follows, the owners’ stage-4 action will be an adjustment to the
ceo’s bonus plan. The events in the stages after the ﬁrst are
Stage . The owners hire the ceo and his base salary, w, is set.
Stage . The owners learn information relevant to the design of the ceo’s bonus
plan.
Stage . The owners ﬁx the the bonus plan.
Stage . The ceo takes an action and receives a bonus, b, according to the plan.
Because our focus is on what happens at stage 3 and later (i.e., after w is
sunk), we are free to reduce notational clutter by omitting w from the payoﬀ
functions.
Consider, ﬁrst, a hidden-information agency problem. The ceo’s utility
is b − C(x,θ), where x ∈ R+ is the ceo’s stage-5 action and θ ∈ {B,G} is
an attribute of the ﬁrm or ceo that aﬀects the ceo’s cost of taking action,
C(x,θ). Assume the ceo learns θ after he is hired, but before he chooses x.
The precise value of θ is his private information. Assume, for both θ, that
C(0,θ) = 0, ∂C(0,θ)/∂x = 0, and ∂2C(x,θ)/∂x2 > 0. Assume, for x > 0, that
∂C(x,B)/∂x > ∂C(x,G)/∂x; that is, attribute (type) G represents a lower
marginal cost of action than attribute (type) B.
The prior probability that θ = G is 1/2. An information structure is a
δ ∈ (0,1/2). At stage 3, the owners learn, with equal likelihood, whether the
probability θ = G is δ + 1/2 or −δ + 1/2. Observe an increase in δ means
the owners have better information. The owners then set the bonus scheme.22
Assume the owners’ payoﬀ is R(x) − b, where R( ) is increasing, concave, and
limx→∞ R′(x) = 0. We rule out negative bonuses (i.e., b ≮ 0).
22We assume the owners unilaterally set the bonus scheme. This is eﬀectively without loss
of generality because the anticipated actions of the owners will be taken into account in the
Stage 2 bargaining over base salary.Hermalin and Weisbach Model 16
Let I(x) = C(x,B)−C(x,G). Note I( ) is the ceo’s information-rent func-
tion. If ψ is the posterior probability that θ = B, then the solution in terms of
actions and bonuses is:23
x(θ) =
(
argmaxx R(x) − C(x,B) −
1−ψ
ψ I(x), if θ = B
















, if θ = G
.
Observe that x(G) is independent of ψ and the ceo’s utility if θ = B is always
0. Hence, with respect to those aspects of his expected utility that change with














where x+ = x(B) when ψ = δ + 1/2 and x− = x(B) when ψ = −δ + 1/2.
Similarly, with respect to terms that change with δ, the owners’ preferences







































(R(x+) − C(x+,B)) − u(δ). (4)
Expression (4) suggests—but does not prove—the owners and ceo have op-
posing preferences with respect to δ. The following proposition provides suf-
ﬁcient conditions for opposing preferences to hold.24 In what follows deﬁne
X(ψ) = x(B) when Pr{θ = B} = ψ.
Proposition 9 Consider the hidden-information agency model. If D is a more
informative disclosure regime than D′ (i.e., δ > δ′), then the owners prefer D
to D′. There exists a δ < 1/2 such that δ > δ′ > δ implies the ceo prefers D′
to D. If the function mapping [0,1]2 → R deﬁned by
(ψ,ψ











23Because this model has been much studied, we leave the derivation to an online appendix.
24We have constructed numerous examples for which opposing preferences hold for all δ and
δ′ ∈ (0,1/2) and failed to construct any for which this is not true. On the other hand, we
have failed to prove that opposing preferences hold for all δ and δ′ ∈ (0, 1/2).Hermalin and Weisbach Model 17
is Schur concave, then δ = 0; that is, owners and ceo have opposing preferences
over the entire space of disclosure regimes.25
Proposition 9 thus shows that there exist a non-empty space of disclosure
regimes for which Condition 1 holds.
Corollary 2 Consider the hidden-information agency model. If R(x) = x and
C(x,θ) = x2/kθ, kG > kB > 0, then the owners and ceo have opposing prefer-
ences over the entire space of disclosure regimes.
As shown in the appendix, for these oft-used functional forms, the function
deﬁned by (5) is Schur concave.
Another consequence of a more informative disclosure regime is the following:
Proposition 10 Consider the hidden-information agency model. The maxi-
mum bonus that can occur in equilibrium is greater the more informative is the
disclosure regime.
Proposition 10 indicates that one consequence of improved disclosure regimes is
that the top incentive-pay awards grow even bigger.
Now consider a hidden-action model. The ceo’s utility is b − χ(x), where
b is again his bonus, x ∈ {0,1} his stage-5 action, and χ : {0,1} → R+ his
disutility of action function, where χ(1) > χ(0) = 0. Assume the owners’ payoﬀ
is R(x) − b, R(1) > R(0). The value R(x) is not veriﬁable (it could, e.g., be an
expected value).
In what follows, consider x = 0 to represent some sort of undesired action
by the ceo. Assume that should the ceo pursue the undesired action, the
owners detect this with probability δ. Assume such detection is veriﬁable (i.e.,
can serve as grounds to deny the ceo a bonus). In other words, all indicators
suggest the ceo is working properly unless the owners should receive evidence to
the contrary. A greater value of δ corresponds to a more informative information
structure.26
25A function f : R2 → R is Schur concave if f(z,y) > f(z′,y′) whenever z > y, z′ >
y′, z′ − y′ > z − y, and z + y = z′ + y′. See, e.g., Chapter 3 of Marshall and Olkin
(1979) for the general deﬁnition. A symmetric function f : R2 → R is Schur concave if
(z − y)
 
∂f(z,y)/∂z − ∂f(z,y)/∂y) < 0 (Marshall and Olkin, Theorem A.4, p. 57). Such a
function is also Schur concave if it is quasi-concave (Marshall and Olkin, p. 69).
26This can be shown formally in terms of Blackwell informativeness. Consider two
regimes with ˜ δ < δ. Let p(x) denote the vector
 
p(x),1 − p(x)
 ⊤, where p(x) =
Pr{evidence ceo chose x = 0|x} under regime δ. Notation with tildes represents correspond-
ing values for regime ˜ δ. The δ regime is more informative in the Blackwell sense if there exists
a garbling matrix G such that ˜ p(x) = Gp(x) for both x. Observe the matrix deﬁned below
is such a garbling matrix:
  ˜ δ 0















1 − δ 1
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A bonus contract is a pair  b0,b1  such that the ceo is paid b0 if the evidence
indicates he took the undesired action and he is paid b1 otherwise. As before,
we assume bonus payments must be non-negative.
If the owners wish to induce the ceo to choose action 0, the best contract
for them is clearly  0,0 . If the owners wish to induce him to choose action 1,
the best contract for them can be shown to be  0,χ(1)/δ  (see online appendix).





Suppose that R(1) is suﬃciently greater than R(0) that (6) holds for all δ in the
set of possible disclosure regimes; that is, it is always in the owners’ interest to
induce the ceo to choose the harder action. Because the left-hand side of (6)
is the owners’ expected equilibrium payoﬀ, while −χ(1) + χ(1)/δ is the ceo’s
equilibrium payoﬀ, the following is immediate.
Proposition 11 Consider the hidden-action agency model. Suppose, over the
set of possible disclosure regimes, the owners wish to induce hard work from the
ceo(i.e., x = 1). If D is a more informative disclosure regime than D′ (i.e.,
δ > δ′), then the owners prefer D to D′ and the ceo prefers D′ to D. That is,
Condition 1 holds.
It is conceivable that if the disclosure regime is suﬃciently uninformative, the
owners do better allowing the ceo to take the undesirable action (i.e., x = 0).
This is worse for the ceo than a regime in which the desirable action is induced.
Hence, the owners and ceo can have coincident preferences for some pairs of
disclosure regimes if going from the less informative to the more informative
means going from inducing the undesirable action to inducing the desirable
action. To be concrete, suppose δ ∈ [0,1] and R(1) − χ(1) > R(0). Then there
exists ¯ δ ∈ (0,1) such that the owners prefer to induce the easier action if δ < ¯ δ.
In this case, both owners and ceo prefer δ > δ′ if δ ≥ ¯ δ > δ′. However, if
1 > δ > δ′ ≥ ¯ δ, then owners and ceo again have diﬀering preferences; the
owners prefer δ and the ceo prefers δ′.
II Extensions: Size, Markets, and Politics
A Firm Size and Other Heterogeneity
Firms vary in many ways and it is, therefore, worth considering how such
heterogeneity—particularly with regard to size—aﬀects the analysis. To that
end, we explore how the owners of ﬁrms that diﬀer along certain dimensions
optimally determine disclosure and what, if any, implication that has for the
CEO’s compensation. Suppose that the owners’ payoﬀ is π(β,δ), where β is
an attribute of the ﬁrm (e.g., size) and δ is a continuous measure of the infor-
mativeness of the disclosure regime (e.g., as used in the models of the previous
section). We assume that Condition 1 holds (e.g., this is one of the learningHermalin and Weisbach Extensions 19
or agency models considered above), which, among other implications, means
∂π(β,δ)/∂δ ≥ 0. We assume that ∂π(β,δ)/∂β > 0 (at least over the relevant
domain of β).
The following relation between pay and attribute exists:
Lemma 2 Assume the owners’ gross proﬁt is strictly increasing in the ﬁrm
attribute (e.g., size) and the disclosure regime is held constant. Then an increase
in the attribute leads to an increase in the ceo’s pay unless the owners have all
the bargaining power.
It is unlikely, however, that the choice of disclosure regime is independent
of the ﬁrm’s attribute. For instance, larger ﬁrms could have a greater marginal
beneﬁt for information than smaller ﬁrms, as would, for example, be true in the
ceo-dismissal model if we assume that both return and the cost of dismissal
increase in ﬁrm size.27 For models such as this, we can show the following:
Proposition 12 Suppose the owners’ marginal return to greater information is
increasing in ﬁrm attribute (i.e., ∂2π(β,δ)/(∂β∂δ) > 0). Suppose, too, the ceo
is risk neutral in income. Assume bargaining is not extreme (i.e., λ ∈ (0,1)).
Then the equilibrium level of the disclosure regime’s informativeness is non-
decreasing in the ﬁrm attribute and the ceo’s equilibrium level of compensation
is strictly increasing in the attribute.
If the owners have all the bargaining power (i.e., λ = 1), then the result still
holds, except the ceo’s compensation would be constant if the optimal disclo-
sure regime represents a corner solution. If the ceo has all the bargaining power,
then owners are indiﬀerent as to the choice of disclosure regime and, thus, all
regimes are optimal from their perspective. If, however, the owners choose the
ceo’s most preferred disclosure regime in that situation, then the result would
also hold.
B A General Equilibrium Analysis
Proposition 3 oﬀered a simple analysis of how a universal change in disclosure
policy could aﬀect ceo compensation. Here, we consider a more nuanced model,
along the lines of Terviö (2008), that explicitly considers general equilibrium
eﬀects.
Suppose there is a continuum of ﬁrms, with each ﬁrm being indexed by β.
Suppose there is an equal measure of ceos, indexed by α. Let α[i] and β[i]
be, respectively, the i × 100 percentile of ceo type and ﬁrm type. That is,
for example, the probability that a randomly drawn ceo has an ability not
exceeding α[i] is i. Assume α[0] > 0. Assume the distributions of α and β are
twice continuously diﬀerentiable; hence, α[ ] and β[ ] are also twice continuously
diﬀerentiable functions. By construction, both functions are strictly increasing.




, where β is ﬁrm size. The ﬁrm’s
payoﬀ would then be π(β,δ) = βΠ(ˆ θ). Given ∂Π(ˆ θ)/∂δ > 0, it is readily seen that
∂2π(β,δ)/(∂β∂δ) > 0.Hermalin and Weisbach Extensions 20
Assume the ceo’s index (type), α, is observable. Let the proﬁt, gross of
ceo compensation, of a ﬁrm of type β that employs a type α ceo and adopts
a disclosure regime δ be αΩ(δ,β), where Ω : R2 → R+ is twice continuously




As will be seen, (7) is consistent with the analysis of the previous subsection,
particularly the complementarity assumption in Proposition 12. Assume better
disclosure raises gross proﬁt; that is, ∂Ω/∂δ > 0. Assume higher type ﬁrms
have greater proﬁt ceteris paribus: ∂Ω/∂β > 0.
Assume the utility of a ceo who works for a ﬁrm with disclosure level δ
and receives compensation w is w + h(d). Assume h( ) is a twice continuously
diﬀerentiable function. Consistent with the models above and Condition 1,
assume h′(δ) < 0. For all α and β, assume the function deﬁned by
δ  → αΩ(δ,β) + h(δ)
is globally concave in δ and has an interior maximum. Global concavity implies
this maximum is unique.
In addition to working for one of the ﬁrms, a ceo can retire or pursue some
vocation other than being a ceo. Let his utility if he does that be u.28
Observe that there are complementarities between ceo type and either ﬁrm
type or disclosure. This means that the value a ﬁrm’s owners place on a ceo
of a given type rises with either the ﬁrm’s type or its level of disclosure. Con-
sequently, if disclosure level is increasing in ﬁrm type, we can expect to see
assortative matching in equilibrium: The highest type ﬁrm hires the highest
type ceo, the ith highest type ﬁrm hires the ith highest type ceo, and so forth.
In fact, such an equilibrium exists as the following lemma establishes:
Lemma 3 An assortative-matching equilibrium of the market described above








In this equilibrium, the ith most productive ceo is paid







˙ α[j]dj , (9)
where ˙ α[j] = dα[j]/dj.
An almost immediate consequence of Lemma 3, particularly expressions (8)
and (9), is
28Alternatively, it could be assumed that a ceo must be a ceo—he is a slave to the
profession—but requires some minimum utility to survive.Hermalin and Weisbach Extensions 21
Proposition 13 In the assortative-matching equilibrium of the market described
above, a higher-type ﬁrm (e.g., a larger ﬁrm) has a greater level of disclosure
than a lower-type ﬁrm. Furthermore, a more able ceo earns greater compen-
sation, has greater utility, and works for a ﬁrm with more stringent disclosure
than a less able ceo.
As the proof of Lemma 3 makes clear, the owners of any given ﬁrm take
into account the potential impact on the type of ceo with whom they will be
“matched,” as well as how much they will need to pay him, when deciding on
their disclosure regime. Notably, these considerations do not cause an eﬃciency
distortion: In equilibrium, the owners choose the regime that maximizes wel-
fare. Hence, any disclosure-increasing reform is necessarily welfare reducing.
Ironically, it is the owners who would suﬀer from reform and the ceos who
would beneﬁt. This is hinted at by (9): If δ[ ] shifts up for a positive measure of
ﬁrm types, then the integral in (9) increases. Because, as can be seen from (9),
any increase in disutility is oﬀset by an increase in compensation, the overall
eﬀect would seem to be an increase in ceo utility. This is not, however, a proof
because we need to verify what the new equilibrium will be. As it turns out,
the result goes through for essentially the reason just given:
Proposition 14 Consider a market for ceos as set forth above. Let δ[ ] be
the equilibrium disclosure schedule absent reform. If a reform is imposed such
that disclosure must be at least δ[ˆ ı], where ˆ ı ∈ (0,1), and this reform causes no
ﬁrms to go out of business, then all ceos will see their compensation increase
in equilibrium and all but the least able ceo will see his utility increase.
Expression (9) also makes clear why the result could depend on no ﬁrm shutting
down: If ﬁrms shutdown, then the lower limit of integration rises, which is a
countervailing eﬀect.
Proposition 14 reaches a diﬀerent conclusion than Proposition 2 about the
impact of a disclosure reform on ceo utility. The diﬀerence lies in the diﬀer-
ent assumptions about the compensation-setting process. Here, for assortative
matching to occur, a higher ability ceo must earn a rent (i.e., u[i] > ¯ u for
i > 0). The size of this rent is eﬀectively a function of the compensation paid
lower ability ceos. Because the lowest ability ceos must see a rise in their com-
pensation to satisfy their participation constraints, this translates into greater
compensation (and, thus, utility) for more able ceos—even if disclosure at the
ﬁrms at which they work doesn’t change. Recall, in Proposition 2, that there
would be no change to ceos’ utilities if they had no bargaining power. This
result is reﬂected in the fact that the lowest ability ceo sees no increase in
utility in Proposition 14.
Note that if the gross proﬁt function, Ω( ,β), were hump-shaped, so that
marginal gross proﬁt, ∂Ω/∂δ, was negative for a signiﬁcantly large reform, then
such a reform reduces the integral in (9). In this case, a large enough reform
would, thus, reduce ceo utility. The eﬀect on ceo compensation is ambiguous:
On the one hand, the rent to being high ability would be reduced, but the direct
compensation for a worse job would increase.Hermalin and Weisbach Extensions 22
C The Political Economy of Disclosure Reform
In light of the analysis to this point, a relevant question is what would be
the impetus for disclosure reform? Given that owners should set disclosure
optimally, accounting for its consequent impact on executive compensation, they
have no reason to desire disclosure reform if it will further increase executive
compensation. At least in some settings, such as those behind Proposition 2,
executives have no reason to desire disclosure reform. To whom, then, are
legislatures, agencies, or exchanges responding when they tighten disclosure?
In this subsection we oﬀer possible answers to that question. Although a
complete analysis of the political economy of corporate governance is beyond
the scope of this paper, we consider three possible answers here, albeit the ﬁrst
two in somewhat cursory fashion.
One explanation is that legislatures simply pander to public outrage.29 The
consequent legislative response could, thus, be more “feel good” than “do good.”
A second, related, explanation is that, as noted by Tirole (2001), corporate
governance has eﬀects on actors other than just shareholders and executives. To
the extent these other stakeholders have no direct say in governance, the level of
governance that arises from the bargaining between shareholders and executives
modeled above could be socially suboptimal with respect to the externalities
imposed on these other shareholders. Legislative or administrative action could
be intended to correct this externality problem.
A third explanation, which we explore in some depth here, is that there is
a commitment problem with respect to owners seeking to increase disclosure.
Speciﬁcally, if D ≻ D′ implies π(D) > π(D′), then, once ceo compensation has
been ﬁxed, the owners have an incentive to raise disclosure. We have heretofore
assumed implicitly that the owners either cannot alter disclosure at this point
or can commit not to do so. A possible justiﬁcation for such commitment is
that were the owners to seek raise disclosure requirements, they would need to
obtain the agreement of the ceo, which presumably could be had only at the
expense of further increasing his compensation. Suppose, instead, the owners
can lobby the legislature to impose higher disclosure. Provided this did not
trigger an immediate increase in the ceo’s compensation, such lobbying could
prove proﬁtable for the owners. The ceo should, of course, anticipate such lob-
bying and bargain for greater initial compensation in anticipation of the owners’
future lobbying; hence, in equilibrium, it could be that successful lobbying by
the owners does not lead to increased compensation for the ceo.
The timing of the game is shown in Figure 1. Suppose there is a lobbying
cost L(y), where L : R+ → R+ is a twice continuously diﬀerentiable function
satisfying L(0) = L′(0) = 0 and L′′(y) > 0 for all y. Suppose the ceo’s utility is
w+u. Assume the functions π( ) and u( ) are twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
29For instance, at the time of our writing during the “Great Recession,” roughly two-thirds of
Americans wanted tougher regulations. A Washington Post-ABC News poll released April 26,
2010 reports that 65% of Americans want tighter regulations on ﬁnancial institutions (United
Press International). An Economist poll released the same week ﬁnds support ranging between



















Figure 1: Timing of Lobbying Model
Further assume (i) π( ) is increasing and concave with limz→∞ π′(z) = 0; and
(ii) u( ) is concave and decreasing with u′(0) = 0.
We continue to assume bargaining is generalized Nash. We treat bargaining
power as ﬁxed. Because a full model of a lobbying game is beyond the scope
of this paper, we limit attention to a world in which the owners can lobby only
once. For convenience, assume an inﬁnite horizon. Let ι be the common interest
rate.
Because the solution to generalized Nash bargaining is independent of multi-
plicative scaling of the parties’ surpluses, we can either view the parties setting
the ceo’s compensation for every period thereafter or we can model them as bar-
gaining each period over that period’s compensation. The resulting per-period
level of compensation will be the same. Hence, the ceo’s future per-period




π(δ + y) − w
￿
+ (1 − λ)log
￿
u(δ + y) + w − ¯ u
￿
.
Hence, per-period compensation in the future, wf, is given by
wf = (1 − λ)π(δ + y) − λ
￿
u(δ + y) − ¯ u
￿
. (10)
The owners’ choice of lobbying is, thus, made to maximize the npv of proﬁts:
max
y












π(δ + y) + u(δ + y) − ¯ u
￿
, (11)
where wo is the originally set compensation. The assumptions made above
ensure that (11) has a unique solution for all δ. Call it y∗(δ).
At the time the parties bargain over wo, they know δ. Moreover, they can
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The results of this analysis are given by the following.
Proposition 15 For the lobbying model just presented, there will be reform in
equilibrium (i.e., y > 0). Unless the ceo has no bargaining power, the reform
will eventually lead to an increase in ceo compensation (i.e., wf > wo). If
the ceo has no bargaining power, then his compensation will be unaﬀected by
the reform. The post-reform disclosure regime exceeds the welfare-maximizing
regime (i.e., δ + y∗(δ) exceeds the welfare-maximizing value).
The possibility that the ceo sees no increase in compensation post reform if
he has no bargaining power might, at ﬁrst, appear at odds with the prediction
of Proposition 1. Appearances here are deceiving: The logic is the same as
in Proposition 1, the only diﬀerence is that compensation is set anticipating
the reform. The ceo’s initial compensation will reﬂect the disutility the future
reform will impose. If he has bargaining power, then his compensation will be
lower initially because the owners’ cost of lobbying means there is less surplus
for him to capture when bargaining for his ﬁrst-period compensation.
For convenience, we have modeled lobbying as deterministic. In reality, the
outcomes of lobbying are likely stochastic. If reform is uncertain, then this
analysis yields a number of predictions. First, owners have an ex post incentive
to lobby for reform. Enactment will be a positive surprise from the perspective
of the market, so the stock price should rise if reform occurs. This does not,
however, mean reform should be encouraged: Were the owners able to commit
not to lobby, the expected npv of their proﬁts would be greater than it is when
they cannot so commit. Hence, if the probability of reform falls, then, in the
long run, ﬁrm values should be higher than they would otherwise have been.
III Implications for Empirical Work
We have presented a series of models suggesting that a ﬁrm’s disclosure policy
is fundamentally connected to its governance. Improved disclosure provides
beneﬁts, but it also entails costs. These costs are both direct, in terms of greater
managerial compensation, and indirect, in terms of the distortions they induce
in managerial behavior (e.g., management’s actions aimed at signal distortion).
This analysis has a number of implications for empirical analysis. First, con-
sider a reform that, holding other things constant, increases the formal disclosureHermalin and Weisbach Implications for Empirical Work 25
requirements—or any kind of exogenous change in the quantity of information
that is available about a ﬁrm (e.g., greater coverage of the ﬁrm in the news me-
dia). Our analysis predicts that, for those ﬁrms for which the reform is binding,
we should observe (i) increases in their ceo’s compensation; (ii) increases in
their ceo’s turnover rates; and (iii) a decreases in ﬁrm value. There has been
an enormous increase in interest in top management compensation and turnover
in recent years (see Huson et al., 2001, and Kaplan and Minton, 2008, for evi-
dence on changes in turnover and compensation); our model suggests that the
increased regulation and media attention of recent years could have contributed
to these trends. In fact, this pattern holds not only in recent U.S. data: Bayer
and Burhop (in press) ﬁnds that German bank executives became more vul-
nerable to dismissal after a major reform in 1884, which increased reporting
requirements. In addition, Bayer and Burhop (2007) ﬁnds that executive com-
pensation also increased following that 19th-century reform.
Another prediction is that stronger disclosure rules and greater scrutiny of
ﬁrms should be associated with an increase in actions aimed at signal distortion
(a past example of such actions being, perhaps, Enron’s use of special-purpose
entities, which led to its ﬁnancial statements being particularly uninformative).
In addition to accounting-related actions, our model suggests that increased
disclosure requirements could lead to changes in real investments, speciﬁcally
an increase in myopic behavior (e.g., substitution away from longer-term in-
vestments, such as r&d, toward shorter-term investments or actions that aﬀect
reported numbers sooner).30
A second category of empirical implications concerns cross-sectional compar-
isons of similarly regulated ﬁrms. Diﬀering underlying structures of businesses
can lead to essentially exogenous diﬀerences in disclosure and transparency.
For example, the relatively transparent nature of information disclosure in the
mutual-fund industry means more information is available about a mutual-fund
manager than is available about managers in industries where information is less
clear cut and harder to assess. Our model suggests that in greater or more infor-
mative disclosure industries, managerial pay and turnover rates will be greater
than in industries with less or less informative disclosure.
There should also be cross-sectional variation in ﬁrm activities across indus-
tries with diﬀerent inherent levels of transparency. For instance, consider again
a mutual-fund manager. His job, which is to pick securities whose identity is
publicly available, is highly transparent. In contrast, a manager of a technology
ﬁrm has a job that is fundamentally less transparent; his investments are harder
to assess and often less observable to an outsider. Our analysis suggests, all else
equal, that in more transparent industries, managers should be more tempted
to manipulate numbers or otherwise engage in signal distortion.
Our analysis also makes predictions about the relation between ﬁrm size and
disclosure regime. Ceteris paribus, larger ﬁrms should choose stronger regimes
30See Stein (1989) for more discussion of such negative npv investments due to managerial
myopia, and Graham et. al (2005) for survey evidence suggesting that executives claim to
engage in such myopic behavior.Hermalin and Weisbach Conclusion 26
than smaller ﬁrms. Indeed, they should have better governance generally.
Another potential test of our model is to consider (i) whether ﬁrms with
more disclosure or higher quality disclosure pay their executives more; and (ii)
whether executives at these ﬁrms have shorter tenures once other factors have
been controlled for. The amount of disclosure (information revealed) could be
measured, for instance, by the amount of press coverage a ﬁrm receives or the
number of analysts following a ﬁrm. The quality of the information disclosed
could be measured directly as was done, for instance, by the Financial Analysts
Federation’s Committee on Financial Reporting.31 Another possible measure of
the quality of reporting could be the precision of analysts’ forecasts; the better
the quality of reporting, the less variance there should be across the forecasts
of diﬀerent analysts.
IV Conclusion
Corporate disclosure is widely seen as an unambiguous good. This paper shows
this view is, at best, incomplete. Greater disclosure tends to raise executive
compensation and can create additional or exacerbate existing agency prob-
lems. Hence, even ignoring the direct costs of disclosure (e.g., meeting stricter
accounting rules, maintaining better records, etc.), there could well be a limit
on the optimal level of disclosure.
The model used to study disclosure reﬂects fairly general organizational is-
sues. A principal desires information that will improve her decision making
(e.g., whether or not to ﬁre the agent, tender her shares, move capital from the
ﬁrm, adjust the agent’s compensation scheme, etc.). In many situations, the
agent prefers the status quo to change imposed by the principal (e.g., he prefers
employment to possibly being dismissed). Hence, better information is view
asymmetrically by the parties: It beneﬁts the principal, but harms the agent.
If the principal did not need to compensate the agent for this harm and if she
could prevent the agent from capturing, through the bargaining process, any of
the surplus this better information creates, the principal would desire maximal
disclosure. In reality, however, she will need to compensate the agent and she
will lose some of the surplus to him. These eﬀects can be strong enough to cause
the principal to optimally choose less than maximal disclosure.
The notion that the principal directly beneﬁts from better information is
fairly general (recall Lemma 1 and Proposition 4). Whether or not the agent is
harmed is more dependent on the speciﬁcs of the model. Nevertheless, we show,
for a number of alternative learning and agency models, that having a better
informed principal is not in the agent’s interest.
We extend the analysis to consider the consequences of ﬁrm size, showing
through a number of analyses that larger ﬁrms will tend, all else equal, to
adopt more stringent disclosure regimes than smaller ﬁrms. We also extend
31See Lang and Lundholm (1993) or Shaw (2003) for examples of work using these measures
of disclosure quality.Hermalin and Weisbach Appendix 27
the analysis to consider general equilibrium eﬀects. We show that, in a model
of assortative matching, there is a positive correlation between the stringency
of a ﬁrm’s disclosure regime and the ability of the manager it employs. A
potentially interesting ﬁnding of that model is that an increase in the disclosure
requirements that bind on only a subset of ﬁrms could, nevertheless, result in
all executives earning more.
Finally, we addressed the political economy of disclosure reform. Our anal-
ysis suggests that shareholders could have an incentive to lobby for disclosure
regime ex post, although they would wish they commit not to do so ex ante.
Although our analysis has focused on disclosure, many of our insights apply
more broadly to any governance reforms. In particular, much of the analysis in
Section II would apply to any reform that gave shareholders a direct beneﬁt,
but imposed a direct cost on management.
This paper also extends the bargaining approach to the study of governance
(see, e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). Once it is recognized that governance
does not descend deus ex machina or is something that shareholders can impose
any way they wish, it is clear that important tensions exist: Shareholders must,
in essence, buy better governance from management at the price of higher man-
agerial compensation. This creates tradeoﬀs that are not immediately apparent
from a deus ex machina view or a view that ignores the existence of a labor mar-
ket for managerial talent. Our analysis also contributes to a growing literature
that demonstrates that better information is not always welfare improving.
Many issues, however, remain. We have abstracted away from any of the
concerns about revealing information to rivals or to regulators that other work
has raised. Because we have focussed on settings in which principal and agent
have opposing preferences concerning improved information, we have largely
ignored those settings in which they have coincident preferences (although see
our analysis of hidden action where we note that if information is initially very
bad, both principal and agent beneﬁt from its improvement). We have also
ignored the mechanics of how the information structure is actually improved;
what accounting rules should be used, what organizational structures lead to
more or less informative information, etc.? While future attention to such details
will, we believe, shed additional light on the subject, we remain conﬁdent that
our general results will continue to hold.
Appendix A: Technical Details and Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: First suppose λ ∈ (0,1). From Topkis’s monotonic-






+ (1 − λ)log
￿
U(D) + v(w) − ¯ u
￿
exhibits increasing diﬀerences; that is, if D ≻ D′ and w > w′ implies
N(w,D) − N(w′,D) > N(w,D′) − N(w′,D′). (14)Hermalin and Weisbach Appendix 28








U(D) + v(w) − ¯ u
. (15)
Suppose D becomes more informative. The denominator of the negative term
in (15) weakly increases and the denominator of the positive term decreases;

















By the fundamental theorem of calculus, the left-hand side of (16) is the left-
hand side of (14) and similarly for the right-hand sides. Hence, (14) has been
proved. To prove the second (the “moreover”) part of the proposition, note that
if w > 0, we have an interior solution to the problem of maximizing (1) with
respect to w. Hence, (15) must equal zero. Since, as shown, the right-hand
side of (15) increases as disclosure becomes more informative, it cannot be that
diﬀerent disclosure regimes yield the same interior solution. Given we showed w
is non-decreasing in informativeness, it follows that it must be increasing when
it is an interior solution.
Suppose λ = 1 (i.e., the owners have all the bargaining power), then the
ceo’s participation constraint,
U(D) + v(w) ≥ ¯ u, (17)
either binds or is slack if it holds at w = 0. When it is slack, the result is obvious
(w can go in only one direction). When it binds, an increase in informativeness
lowers U(D), which must be oﬀset by an increase in w to maintain (17) as an
equality.
Suppose λ = 0 (i.e., the ceo has all the bargaining power), then the owners’
participation constraint,
π(D) − w ≥ 0, (18)
binds. Because an increase in informativeness raises π(D) (weakly), it must be
oﬀset by an increase in w to maintain (18) as an equality.
Proof of Proposition 2: Recall we have restricted attention to settings in
which the ceo’s compensation is positive. Hence, given D, w(D) satisﬁes the
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Because Dr ≻ D∗, w(Dr) > w(D∗). This implies the numerator of the second
term in (19) is no greater when D = Dr than when D = D∗ because v′( ) is
a non-increasing function. By (20), the denominator of the ﬁrst term in (19)
is smaller when D = Dr than when D = D∗. The only way, then, that the
equality (19) can be maintained is if the denominator of the second term gets
smaller. Given that ¯ u is a constant, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3: Consider, ﬁrst, λ ∈ (0,1). The proof is similar to










Suppose D becomes more informative. The denominator of the negative term







The rest follows immediately as shown in the proof of Proposition 1. (Recall
we have now restricted attention to settings in which the ceo’s compensation is
positive.) The case λ = 0 is identical to that in the proof of Proposition 1. Fi-





which is invariant with D, as claimed.
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider ˆ θ  = ˆ θ′. Without loss of generality, take ˆ θ > ˆ θ′.
Fix   ∈ (0,1) and deﬁne ˆ θµ =  ˆ θ + (1 −  )ˆ θ′. We wish to show
Π(ˆ θµ) ≤  Π(ˆ θ) + (1 −  )Π(ˆ θ′). (22)
By deﬁnition of a maximum:












(ˆ θ − ˆ θµ), (23)
where the equality follows by adding and subtracting γ
￿
a∗(ˆ θµ)
￿ˆ θµ and the def-
inition of Π( ). Expression (23) similarly holds with ˆ θ′ in place of ˆ θ. Call (23)
with ˆ θ′ instead of ˆ θ (23′). Multiplying (23) by   and (23′) by 1− , then adding
the two expressions yields:




 ˆ θ + (1 −  )ˆ θ′ − ˆ θµ
￿
= Π(ˆ θµ);
that is, (22), as was to be shown.Hermalin and Weisbach Appendix 30
Proof of Proposition 6: The claim about the owners was proved in the
text. The result follows if we can show F( |D′)
≥



































































































and the second because distributions are increasing functions.
Proof of Corollary 1: The corollary follows from Proposition 6 if the con-
ditions for the latter can be shown to hold. Because the distribution of s given
θ is normal with mean θ and variance 1/δ, the distribution of s given the prior




(DeGroot, 1970, p. 167), it follows that the prior distribution of ˆ θ is normal
with mean zero and variance
Var(ˆ θ) =
δ2




The mean and median of a normal distribution coincide. Observe we have






(δ + τ)2 > 0. (26)
The result follows from (26) given Lemma A.1 proved below.
Lemma A.1 Consider two normal random variables, X and Y , with common
mean,  , and variances σ2
X and σ2
Y , where σ2
X < σ2
Y . Then the distribution of
X dominates the distribution of Y in the dispersive order.
32The random variable s is the sum of two independently distributed normal variables s−θ
(i.e., the error in s) and θ; hence, s is also normally distributed. The means of these two
random variables are both zero, so the mean of s is, thus, 0. The variance of the two variables
are 1/δ and 1/τ respectively, so the variance s is 1/δ + 1/τ.Hermalin and Weisbach Appendix 31
Proof: Let Ξ and Ψ denote the distribution functions for X and Y , respectively.
By deﬁnition Ξ
≥
dispΨ if and only if
Ξ−1(ζ′′) − Ξ−1(ζ′) < Ψ−1(ζ′′) − Ψ−1(ζ′) (27)
for any ζ′′ and ζ′ such that 1 > ζ′′ > ζ′ > 0. Expression (27) is equivalent to
Ψ−1(ζ′) − Ξ−1(ζ′) < Ψ−1(ζ′′) − Ξ−1(ζ′′);
hence, Ξ
≥
dispΨ if and only if Ψ−1(ζ) − Ξ−1(ζ) is increasing in ζ. Replacing ζ
with Ξ(z) reveals that Ξ
≥
dispΨ if and only if Ψ−1￿
Ξ(z)
￿
− z is increasing in z.
Let Φ( ) be the distribution function for the standard normal random variate
(i.e., with mean 0 and variance 1). As is well known,
Ξ(x) = Φ
￿
x −  
σX
￿
and Ψ(y) = Φ
￿








− z =   + σY Φ−1
￿
Φ






(z −  ),
which, because σY > σX, is an increasing function of z.



















Due to owners’ concern about the information rent the ceo earns,
x(B) < argmax
x
R(x) − C(x,B) ≡ x
∗
B .
By assumption R(x)−C(x,B) is concave in x. Hence, R(x)−C(x,B) is increas-
ing in x for x < x∗
B. It follows that the sign of (28) is positive. Let X(ψ) = x(B)
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where the terms are signed as indicated because X( ) is an increasing function
and it was earlier shown I( ) is also increasing. As δ → 1/2, ψ− → 0; hence,
the unsigned term goes to zero as δ → 1/2. The signed terms do not go to zero
as δ → 1/2. By continuity, therefore, there exists a δ < 1/2 such that u′(δ) < 0
for all δ > δ. Finally, to establish the last claim, consider δ > δ′. Observe
ψ+ − ψ− = 2δ > 2δ′ = ψ′
+ − ψ′
− and ψ+ + ψ− = 1 = ψ′
+ + ψ′
− .
Because (5) is Schur concave, the result follows from the deﬁnition of Schur
concavity.






2(kG − (1 − ψ)kB)
.






























































2(kG − (1 − ψ)kG)3 .
Hence (32) holds if
kG − (1 − ψ)kG
kG − (1 − ψ′)kG
> 1,
which is readily seen as true.









. Given that I( ) and X( ) are increasing, the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose bargaining is not extreme; that is, λ ∈ (0,1).
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. In particular, we need to





+ (1 − λ)log
￿
U(δ) + v(w) − ¯ u
￿
. (33)Hermalin and Weisbach Appendix 33









Hence, ∂N(w,β)/∂w is increasing in β. When ceo has all the bargaining power,
the claim is immediate given that w = π(β,δ) in that case.
Proof of Proposition 12: Because the ceo is risk neutral in income, his util-
ity is v(w) = ν0 +ν1w, where ν0 and ν1 are constants, with ν1 > 0. Generalized





U(δ) + ν0 + ν1w − ¯ u
= 0.
Hence,




U(δ) + ν0 − ¯ u
￿
. (34)





U(δ) + ν0 − ¯ u
￿
. (35)





It follows from the usual comparative statics that the owners’ choice of δ is
non-decreasing in β.33 The result about the ceo’s compensation follows from
Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 (alternatively, it follows directly from (34) using
the envelope theorem).
Proof of Lemma 3: We will show that the owners’ choosing the δ[i]s deﬁned
by program (8) leads to an assortative-matching equilibrium. By assumption,
that program has a unique maximum, so δ[i] is well deﬁned for all i. Because
the marginal return to δ increases in i, δ[ ] is an increasing function. By the
implicit function theorem, it is diﬀerentiable. We ﬁrst show that if the owners
are collectively playing the δ[ ] what the assortative-matching equilibrium is. We
then show that given the equilibrium of that subgame, it is indeed an equilibrium
for the owners to choose those δ[i]s. Assume the owners have chosen the δ[i]s




is increasing in i. Hence,
the equilibrium of the market subgame will exhibit assortative matching. To
deﬁne that equilibrium, let u[i] denote the equilibrium utility of the ith most
able ceo and let w[i] denote his compensation. Because the equilibrium exhibits
33Actually strictly increasing unless δ is at a corner.Hermalin and Weisbach Appendix 34




, where δ[i] is the level of
disclosure chosen by the ith highest type ﬁrm. We can follow Terviö (2008) and



















− u[j] | {z }
−inducement
and (36)
u[i] ≥ u, (37)
for all i. Expression (36) is the requirement that a ﬁrm prefer to hire the ceo
“intended” for it rather than lure a ceo “intended” for another type of ﬁrm.
Observe, such luring means paying at least enough that the ceo in question is
indiﬀerent between working for his match—which yields him utility u[j]—and
the luring ﬁrm—which yields him utility h(δ[i]) + w; that is, the inducement




. Condition (37) is the ceo participation
constraint.
Expression (36) is a statement of revealed preference. Hence, employing the

















Expression (38) implies that ceo utility is increasing in type. In addition, by

















˙ α[j]dj . (39)
Because we are assuming that ﬁrms make oﬀers to ceos, the lowest type ﬁrm





it follows that u[0] = ¯ u. The expression for the equilibrium wage schedule—i.e.,
expression (9)—follows. We now show that it is an equilibrium for the owners










is the percentile of the ceo with which a type-β[i] ﬁrm




= i. Because δ[ ] is diﬀer-




for all i. Suppose an owner expects all other owners
to play according to the δ[ ]. We wish to show that doing the same is a best
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In other words, anticipating how the assortative-matching subgame will play
out, the owners of a β[i] ﬁrm must wish to choose the disclosure regime expected
of them in equilibrium, δ[i]. The ﬁrst-order condition is

























where the second equality follows from the deﬁnition of m(δ,β). Observe that
δ = δ[i] solves (41). The result follows if we verify that this constitutes a global






































where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the deﬁnition of δ[m] and the fact that
αΩ(δ,β) + h(δ) is globally concave in δ; and the second inequality follows be-
cause the marginal return to disclosure is increasing in ﬁrm type. Hence, no
δ < δ[i] can satisfy (41) and, moreover, (41) is increasing in δ for δ < δ[i]. A
similar analysis, omitted for the sake of brevity, shows that no δ > δ[i] can sat-
isfy (41) and, moreover, (41) is decreasing in δ for δ > δ[i].
Proof of Proposition 13: It was shown as part of the proof of Lemma 3
that δ[ ] is an increasing schedule. Because matching is assortative, a more able
ceo therefore faces more stringent disclosure (i.e., a greater δ) than a less able
ceo. That a more able ceo enjoys greater utility is immediate from (39). To
see that a more able ceo enjoys greater compensation than a less able ceo, use



































˙ α[i] > 0.Hermalin and Weisbach Appendix 36
Proof of Proposition 14: Given the monotonicity of β[ ], we will adopt the
short hand of calling i a ﬁrm’s type. The pre-reform equilibrium is described
in the text. Consider equilibrium post reform. Because δ[ ] is increasing, it
follows that the requirement δ ≥ δ[ˆ ı] must bind on all ﬁrm types i <ˆ ı vis-à-vis
their disclosure in the pre-reform equilibrium. We wish to verify that the new
equilibrium disclosure schedule, ˜ δ[ ], is given by
˜ δ[i] =
￿
δ[ˆ ı] , if i <ˆ ı





is increasing, the same analysis used in proving Lemma 3
demonstrates that, if the owners play the ˜ δ[ ] schedule, then the equilibrium of
the subgame exhibits assortative matching and u[ ] is given by (39) (with ˜ δ[j]
substituted for δ[j]). Consider an i-type ﬁrm, i > ˆ ı. Because β[i] > β[ˆ ı], any
feasible deviation for i would cause it to be matched to an α[j] ceo where j >ˆ ı.
Let ˆ δ denote the deviation. Because ˜ δ[j] = δ[j] for all j > ˆ ı, observe that the
deviation ˆ δ would cause the ﬁrm to match to the same α[j] in the post-reform































































































˙ α[z]dz , (46)
where the last equality follows because i and j both exceedˆ ı. The contradiction
(46) establishes that the supposition that i wished to deviate in the post-reform
game is false. The same reasoning can be used to show that theˆ ı-type ﬁrm does
not wish to deviate.Hermalin and Weisbach Appendix 37
Consider an i-type ﬁrm, i < ˆ ı. Deﬁne m(δ,β) as in the proof of Lemma 3
(except the relevant schedule is ˜ δ[ ]). We need to show










￿˜ δ[j],β[j]) ˙ α[j]dj . (47)
Following a derivation similar to the one in (41), the derivative of (47) with








Disclosure δˆ ı will be a best response for i if (48) is negative for all δ ≥ δˆ ı. For










Because β[m] > β[i], ˜ δ[m] < δ. Using (41) and the fact that α[j]Ω(δ,β[j]) + h(δ)



















Recalling that m = m(δ,β[i]), we have shown (48) is negative for all δ ≥ δˆ ı, so
δˆ ı is indeed an i-type ﬁrm’s best response.
Given we have shown the schedule ˜ δ[ ] is an equilibrium of the post-reform
game, the result follows for the reasons given in the text.
Proof of Proposition 15: It is readily seen that wo ≤ wf (compare (10)
to (12) noting both are to be evaluated at δ + y∗(δ)) with strict inequality if
y∗(δ) > 0 and λ < 1.
Because both π( ) and u( ) are concave, it follows from standard comparative-
statics analysis that y∗′(δ) < 0 whenever y∗(δ) > 0. Because π′(0) > 0, it follows
that y∗(0) > 0. The assumptions on π( ), u( ), and L( ) imply the derivative of
(11) with respect to y is strictly negative for δ large enough. It follows from all





π′(¯ δ) + u′(¯ δ)
￿
= 0, (49)
where the left-hand side of (49) is the derivative of (11) with respect to y
evaluated at y = 0. Observe (49) implies
π
′(¯ δ) + u
′(¯ δ) < 0. (50)
The concavity of π( ) and u( ) imply, therefore, that the derivative of (13) with
respect to δ is negative for all δ > ¯ δ. It follows the owners would never choose








π′￿¯ δ + y∗(¯ δ)
￿
+ u′￿¯ δ + y∗(¯ δ)
￿￿
< 0, (51)Hermalin and Weisbach Appendix 38
where the inequality follows from (50) given y∗(¯ δ) = 0 and L′(0) = 0. Hence, in
equilibrium, it must be optimal for the owners to choose a δ such that y∗(δ) > 0.















The ﬁrst term on the left-hand side is positive (recall y∗′(δ) < 0), so the second
must be negative. But the second term is a constant times the derivative of
welfare. Given welfare is globally concave in total disclosure, if follows that
δ + y∗(δ) must exceed the welfare-maximizing level.
Proposition A.1 Consider the model of Section I. Suppose the (expected) pay-
oﬀ to the owners if they retain the incumbent ceo equals his ability and their
payoﬀ if they ﬁre him is −f − g, where f > 0 is a ﬁring cost and g ≥ 0 is a
golden parachute. Assume the ceo’s utility is given by (2); that is, he loses
ℓ if ﬁred. Finally, suppose the owners possess all the bargaining power. Then





−f − g , if ˆ θ < −f − g













































+ w , (53)
where w is his non-contingent compensation. For the ceo to be willing to accept
employment (53) cannot be less than the ceo’s reservation utility, ¯ u. Because
w is a pure expense, the owners optimally set it as low as possible, hence the
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Clearly, the only solution to (54) is g = ℓ. Given that solution, the left-hand side
of (55) becomes φ, verifying the indicated inequality. Because σ is monotone in
q, this implies that the optimal q is the largest possible q.
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